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ABSTRACT

The legal debate over statutes which allow special treatment
for child witnesses of sexual abuse has sparked recent
discussion. These statutes permit the testimony of the children
to be videotaped or transmitted via one- or two-way closed
circuit television into the courtroom. Critics argue these
statutes violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Right - to be confronted by the witnesses against him/her.
Supporters feel these measures are necessary to protect the
interests of young victims of sexual abuse. The goal of this

.

paper is to address the tension between society's interest in
protecting child victims and the right of defendants to confront
witnessed against them, discussing statutes, cases, and arguments
concerning this issue.
The paper "begins by introducing the problem of child sexual
abuse, including the factors which contribute to the problem
of under-reporting and the difficulties of prosecuting child
sexual abuse cases.

The next section, Statutory Comparison,

presents the response of many state legislatures - various child
protection statutes

that permit modification of courtroom

procedure in sexual abuse

cases.

The third section examines

the cases which occurred as a result of these statutes, including
two main Supreme Court cases - Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig.
The arguments on both sides of this issue are then presented.
Finally, the conclusion evaluates the current standing of the
issue, realizing that this is an unsettled issue which is likely
to continue to change and spark future debate.

INTRODUCTION OF PROBLEM - Statistics

In April of 1993, the National Committee for the Prevention
of Child Abuse (NCPA) estimated that 2,936,000 cases of child
abuse were reported to pubric social service/child protective
services agencies in 1992 throughout America. Approximately
17% of all cases reported were sexual abuse cases.

This figure

translates to nearly 500,0000 children reported for some sort
of molestation or sexual abuse in 1992 (American Humane
Association):
As shown in the following table, 12,019 children in Illinois
alone were reported for sexual abuse in 1992 (Illinois Department
of Children and Family Services).

Table 1

Sexual Abuse Reported and Indicated
Fiscal Years 1985 through 1992
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Flscal
Year

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000

Children
Reported

8,131
8.396
9,n1
10,616
11,026
10,326
10,490
12,019

Children
Indicated

4,734
4,868
5,307
5,692
5,618
5,182
4,809
5,346

o

Source: Child Abuse and Neglect Statistics, Annual Report Fiscal
Year 1992. IL Department of Children and Family Services.
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Recent statistics indicate that at least one in four
American females and one in ten American males experience sexual
victimization before the age of eighteen ("Rape Shield Laws ••• "
1993). However, the incident rate of child sexual abuse is not
fully known. Under-reporting of cases added to the secrecy
and stigma that surround this issue makes most statistics
unreliable.

Under-reporting
•

It is believed that the incidence of child sexual abuse
is grossly under-reported; an estimated 100,000 to 500,00
American children will be sexually abused a year (Russell 1983).
other estimates have reached as high as 200,000 to 500,000 cases
of sexual abuse perpetrated on female children alone (Collins
1982). Statistics understate the problem because a substantial
number of cases are never revealed. The main reason for the
lack of reporting is that children do not reveal the incident.
Children are the "perfect " targets because of this reluctance
to disclose.

Children are conditioned to comply with authority

their whole lives. They are in a subordinate position and are
fearful of threats. Also, children are susceptible to bribes
and promises of reward.
Additionally, they are more easily victimized because
children are intensely curious, naive with regard to social
2

norms, and may respond willingly to intimate and gentle contact
because they associate this with feelings of being loved.

For

these reasons, physical violence is rarely necessary or utilized
(Yun 1983). Force is not necessarily used because the perpetrator
is most often a child's authority figure and/or family member
or friend, as shown by table 2.

Detail Tables: Indicated Sexual Abuse
Fiscal Year 1992

Table 2

Perpetrators: Relationship to Victims

RelationshIp

Number
Perpetrator.

Natural Parent
1,085
Step-Parent
457
Other
1,099
Parental Substitute
500
Babysitter
424
Sibling
471
AuntlUncle
417
. Adoptive Parent
40
Foster Parent
16
Day Care Provider
6
Institutional Staff
14
.Grandparents
180
TOTAL

4,709

Number
Male

Number
Female

780
446
873
486
383
436
402
38
13
2
11
164

300
11
68
13
40

4,034

509

35
15

2
3

4
2
16

eNote: Non-Duplicated Count
166 perpetrators are of an unknown sex.

Source: Child Abuse and Neglect Statistics, Annual Report Fiscal
Year 1992, Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services.

Secrecy is enforced in cases where the child and the family
know the abuser, which also adds to the child's reluctance to
3

reveal that he or she has been sexually abused.

"A child is

three times more likely to be molested by a recognized, trusted
adult than by a stranger" (Summit p.182 1983). With sexual abuse
often occurring in or near the home, the stigma and secrecy
is enhanced and reporting diminished. The National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect asserts accurate statistics for child
sexual abuse may never be obtained because it is possibly the
most concealable form of child maltreatment (Russell p.183 1983).
Obviou~ly,

because most offenders are usually friends,

neighbors, or family members of victims, the child molester
is not the stereotypical low-life lurking about in a trenchcoat.
Although many parents warn their children to stay away from
strangers offering candy, few offenders wear raincoats and carry
candy.

Molesters come from all walks of life and all

socioeconomic categories, and "they look just like the neighbor
next door. They may even be the neighbor next door" (Yun 1983).
Anyone, even members of the most respected professions, may
commit sexual abuse upon children (Crewdson 1988). "Molesters
cut across economic, social, and educational lines.

They may

be rich or poor, well-educated or ignorant, blue-collar or white,
married or single" ("The Child Molester • .

p.1 1984). Child

molesters do not fall into one particular age group.

Thus,

there is no typical profile of a child molester. As tables 3
and 4 (on the top of the next page) demonstrate, perpetrators
fall into all race/ethnic groups and age groups.
4
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Table 3

Perpetrators: Race/Ethnic Group
Racel
Ethnic Group

Number
Perpetrators

White

2,776
1,188
425
31
289
4,709

Black
Hispanic
Other
Not Identified
TOTAL

Number
Male
2,425
1,052
393
29
135
4,034

Number
Female
348
122
28
1
10
509

'Note: ~on-Duplicated Count; male and female numbers
do not Include 166 perpetrators whose sex is not known.

Table 4

Perpetrators: Age
Number
Perpetrators

Age Group
Under 20

1,026
922
1,349
567
238
169
438
4,709

20-29
30.39
40-49
50·59
60 or Older

Not Identified
TOTAL

Number
Male

943
792
1,149
501
222
163
264
4,034

Number
Female
80
127
197

65
16

6
18
509

°Note: Non-Duplicated Count; male and female numbers
do not include 166 perpetrators whose sex is not known.

Source: Child Abuse and Neglect Statistics, Annual Report Fiscal
Year 1992. Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services.

Children of all socioeconomic backgrounds and ages are
at risk of sexual abuse.

The ages of victims range from early

infancy (one to two months)

to 17 to 18 years old. No particular

age group is immune to sexual abuse, nor are the

victims

confined to any particular class (Sgroi 1975). Table 5
illustrates that child victims are from both sexes and all ages
and ethnic groups.
5

Graph 5

Victims: Age, Sex. Race/Ethnic Group
Number

Child Characterlala
Age gf ChjJd

0-2
3·5
6-9
10-13
14-17

~e not reported

Sex of Child

Boys

Girts
Sex not reported
CbOd's Ethnic Groye

Whit.

Black
Hispanic
Other/not reported

TOTAL

Percent

200
1,080
1,418
1,459
1,188
1

3.7
20.2
26.5
27.3
22.2
0:0

1,142
4,189
15

21.4
78.4
0.3

3,359
1,425
447
115

62.8
26.7
8.4
2.1

5,346

100.0

Source: Child Abuse and Neglect Statistic, Annual Report Fiscal
Year 1992. Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services.

The reluctance to report is also common on the part of
the parent. Parents are often unwilling to believe or admit
the possibility that their child has been sexually assaulted
(Yun 1983). The unwillingness of parents to admit the occurrence
of sexual abuse upon their children contributes both to
under-reporting and to difficulty in prosecuting sexual abuse
cases. Even if parents do report abuse, they are reluctant to
proceed for two main reasons:
be served

(1) fear that justice will not

because of the difficulty in successfully prosecuting

sexual abuse cases and (2) fear that pursuing the case will
further traumatize the child (Rogers 1980).
6
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(1) The first fear is justified by statistical evidence.
In a 1969 study of 250 cases of child sex abuse that had been
reported in to New York City's protective services, less than
one percent of the molesters were sent to jail. A more recent
study of sex offenders (238 men) in the

Sexual Behavior Clinic

of the New York State Psychiatric Institute showed that only
50% had ever spent time in jail.

These perpetrators had

committed a total of 16,666 acts of child molestation, an average
of 68.3 molestations per offender, according to the director
of the clinic, Dr. Gene Abel (Collins 1982). A separate study
by the American Psychological Association revealed that of the
261 child sexual abuse cases tracked over a two-year period
in the District of Columbia, only 8 cases actually came to trial
(Rogers 1980).
(2) The fear of traumatizing the child victim by reporting
the abuse and pursuing prosecution is the second factor which
deters parents from following through when a child discloses.
Children may be traumatized by interviews and/or testifying
in court.

"Many researchers and commentators have suggested

that the trauma associated with testifying in open court in
the presence of the defendant, judge, and jury is nearly as
great as that associated with the abuse itself" (Shaffer p.78
1990). This trauma is sometimes referred to as the second
victimization of the child, and it is the reason many cases
never go to trial.

7
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Difficulty in Prosecution

Successful prosecution of child abuse so difficult for
a number of reasons. Child Sexual abuse is an act rarely
witnessed by others. It is very difficult to prove; lack of
corroborative physical evidence is common.

Therefore,

prosecutors may often decide not to litigate a child sexual
abuse case (Fields 1992). As earlier noted, parents often

do

not want their child to have to testify, making prosecution
nearly impossible. Even when the child does testify in court,
he or she is commonly met with skepticism, from the court and
the public. An additional obstacle and fear of prosecutors is
that

children will be unable to provide adequate testimony

(Nuce 1990).

Many cases may come down to the victims word

against the accused.

Therefore, the prosecutor is forced to

rely heavily on the testimony of the child (Cusick 1991). The
child victim's testimony becomes crucial to obtaining convictions
because their eyewitness testimony is usually the only direct
link between the victim, the crime, and the offender (Forman
1989).

8
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STATUTORY COMPARISON

In response to public outcries, state legislatures
nationwide have been summoned to respond to the crisis of child
sexual abuse (Shaffer 1990).
Because of the unusual nature of child sexual abuse -
the length of time over which it occurs, the lack of
force or violence, the failure of the child to report
or to seem traumatized -- and the subsequent difficulty
of proving the offense, courts are liberalizing certain
evidentiary rules and courtroom procedures.
In
recognition of this need for change, most state
legislatures have enacted child protection statutes
which permit certain modifications of courtroom
procedure in sexual abuse cases" (Nuce 1990).
Responding to growing public alarm,

many states have

adopted statutory measures that attempt to minimize the
psychological trauma experienced by victims during the courtroom
procedure (Cusick 1991). The result has been an array of child
shield statutes. Many states allow the transmission of the
child's testimony by one- or two-way closed-circuit television.
Others permit the use of videotaped interviews of children
witnesses (Nuce 1990). Many of these statutes also make it easier
to prosecute child molesters.
But this is not a new development. Since 1977 several states
have enacted statutes allowing the testimony of sexually abused
children to be videotaped.

All but one of these statutes placed

an age limit on the use of the procedure. The statutes
varied in three other areas:

(1) the findings that must

9

also
be

•

made to have the child's testimony videotaped prior to the
trial; (2) the procedures that must be followed while
videotaping;

(3) the findings that must be made in order to

have the tape admitted into evidence at the trial
(Weintraub

1985).

By 1985, ten states had enacted statutes allowing for
videotape depositions of child victims of sexual offenses
(Kelly 1985). By 1989 that number had risen to twenty-seven
states that had created statutes authorizing the videotaping
of children's testimony.

Additionally, twenty-one states had

enacted provisions which permitted the use of one-way closed
circuit televisions, one-way screens, and one-way mirrors
(Forman 1989).

Two years later, thirty-seven states had

provisions for admission of videotaped testimony of a child;
and thirty-one states allowed the use of closed-circuit
television when taking a child's testimony (Lang 1991).
But, just as in 1977, these statutes vary from state to
state. Ordering the taping is one area where statutes differ.
At least eight videotape statutes do not require that the court
make a specific finding regarding the child's ability to testify
at trial before ordering that the child's testimony be taped.
For the most part, these statutes rely only on the request or
motion by the prosecutor or the victim.

On the other hand,

statutes in at least five states provide that the child's
testimony can be taped prior to the trial only if the court

10

finds that the child is likely to suffer some degree of emotional
harm if required to appear in court.

Colorado and Wisconsin

both have the latter type of statute, while Kentucky, Arizona,
and Texas (virtually identical) require merely a request by
the prosecutor.

The Indiana statute does not mention the need

for a court order prior to taping. The statutes of Maine,
Montana, New Mexico, New York, and South Dakota require a case
by case analysis of the possible trauma the child witness may
suffer (Weintraub 1985). Texas and Kentucky statutes contain
a separate provision.

It specifies that during a videotaping

session, "[t]he court shall permit the defendant to observe
and hear the testimony of the child in person, but shall ensure
that the child cannot hear or see the defendant"
("The Testimony • •• "

p.806 1985).

The Iowa legislature's

purpose was to "assure the fair and compassionate treatment
of victims" and to "protect them from intimidation and further
injury."

The Iowa statute allows for a child to testify via

closed-circuit television or by videotape (Shaffer 1990).
Illinois does not have a statute that allows for procedural
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause in the case of sexual
abused children.

According to Judge Charles Witte of the McLean

County Circuit Court, videotaping and closed circuit testimony
is not allowed because it violates the defendant's Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Right (Witte 4/8/94).

Illinois does

appoint court guardians who will prepare child witnesses for

11
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what to expect during the trial.

Guardians show children around

the courtroom and let them become more comfortable in their
situation.

Judge Witte added that he has let children testify

while sitting in the lap of a parent or trusted adult, provided
the adult does not physically influence the testimony of the
child.

12
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COURT RESPONSE TO STATUTES

The various statutes, designed to facilitate the legal
process and ease the pain of testifying in the presence of the
accused, have caused controversy because they potentially
conflict

with the defendant's constitutional right to

confrontation. (Shaffer 1990). The confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment provides: "In
accused

sha~l

all criminal prosecutions, the

enjoy the right

to be confronted with the

witnesses against him • • • " (Fields 1990). But there is debate
over the literal meaning of the confrontation clause and the
original intent.

The Founding Fathers' original intent of the

Confrontation Clause is controversial.

Justice Harlan stated

in California v. Green 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970), "the
Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment." He added,

History seems to give us very little insight into
the intended scope of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause [because] • • • the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment is not one that we may
assume the Framers understood as the embodiment of
settled usage at common law (California v. Green p.158
1970) •
But, since Mattox v. United states, 156 U.S. 237, 244 in 1895,
the Supreme Court has acknowledged the truth-finding purpose
of the Confrontation Clau·se. Mattox was a landmark Supreme Court
case on this issue.

The opinion held that the practice of trying

13

•

defendants based on affidavits and depositions denied the
defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser face to face
before a jury.

Therefore, the purpose of the Confrontation

Clause was interpreted to insure the witness makes a statement
under oath, to force a cross examination of the witness, and
to allow the jury to observe the witness' demeanor during
testimony (Forman 1989).
Yet, more recent rulings in the area of child sexual abuse
have proven to be less stringent on the Confrontation Clause,
particularly if there is reason to believe that testifying would
be so traumatic to the child that he or she would be unable
to communicate clearly in the courtroom. People v. Rivera
(N.Y.

Sup. 1988) held that it was sufficient for the court

to make findings of necessity by its own conclusions and
observations. In state v. Crandall (N.J. 1989) the opinion stated
that in the absence of reasons to the contrary a child witness
should be evaluated by a psychiatrist to determine potential
trauma. Additionally, although the conviction was reversed in
state v. Eaton (Kan. 1989) because the trial court erroneously

held that the Kansas statute did not require a finding that
the child witness would be traumatized such that the witness
would be unable to communicate effectively to testify, the court
upheld the constitutionality of the statute by implying a need
requirement for future case (Shaffer 1990). In Florida, its
Supreme Court found that the introduction at trial of a child

14
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victim's videotaped testimony under section 92.53, Florida
statutes, did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation
(Lang 1 991 ) •
The United states Supreme Court, however, applied the
Confrontation Clause more strictly than the above mentioned
case rulings had in the important ruling, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.s.
1012.

Coy v. Iowa - THE CASE

'.

John Avery Coy was arrested in August of 1985.

He was

charged with sexually assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls.
The state made a motion, at the trial of Coy, to allow the two
girls to testify behind a screen or using closed-circuit
television, to avoid further traumatizing the thirteen year
olds.
a

Because of an Iowa statutory procedure, the court allowed

large screen to be placed between the defendant and the girls

while they testified.

Neither of the girls could see the

defendant, but Coy could see them faintly through the screen.
After John Avery Coy was found guilty, he appealed; Coy attacked
the constitutionality of the procedure in the state courts
(Shaffer 1990).
The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the statute, the procedure
and the use

of the screen (Forman 1989). Therefore, the Supreme

Court of Iowa affirmed Coy's Conviction (State v. Iowa 1986).

15
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Coy then sought review by the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court reversed the decision.

The United States

The Court ruled that

the use of the screen violated the defendant's rights under
the Confrontation Clause (Shaffer 1990).

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION - The Majority Opinion
By

a 6-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the

conviction of Coy.

In Coy, the majority opinion was delivered

by Justice Scalia. Joining in the majority opinion were Justices
Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, Stevens, and White.

Justice

O'Connor filed a concurring opinion which was joined by Justice
White.

The dissent was filed by Justice Blackmun and was joined

by Chief Justice Rehnquist.

Although Justice Kennedy had been

appointed at this time, he did not participate in the decision
(Shaffer 1990).
The majority found that the defendant's right to
face-to-face confrontation had been violated in this case.
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that the clause guarantees
a criminal defendant the right to confront witnesses

giving

evidence against him (or her) at the trial (Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. p.1016 1988).

The Court rejected the argument from the

state that the necessity of protecting the victims of sexual
abuse outweighed the right of confrontation (Coy, p.1021 1988).
The majority asserted that the use of the screen during the
16
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girls testimony made the defendant appear guilty, therefore
denying the defendant the presumption of innocence.

The majority

opinion exclaimed "It is difficult to imagine a more obvious
violation of the defendant's right to a face-to-face encounter."
Scalia traced the history of the right to confront witnesses
and concluded that "there is something deep in human nature
that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and
accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution'"
(Coy, p.102q 1988).

Justice Scalia also described the

"irreducible literal meaning" of the Confrontation clause as
the "'right to meet face to face all those who appear and give
evidence at the trial'" (Coy, p.1020 1988).
This was the first time that the Court had conclusively
stated that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendants
the right to a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses against
them.

The majority did acknowledge that "face-to-face presence

may, unfortunately, upset the truthful • • • abused child • • "
(Coy, p.1021 1988). But, Scalia added confrontation may also

reveal a child witness who has been coached by a malevolent
adult. Justice Scalia stated, "It is a truism that constitutional
protections have costs (Coy, p.1021 1988).
Scalia continued by addressing the States suggestion that
the confrontation interest was outweighed by the necessity of
protecting the victims. He acknowledged that the Court has,
in the past, indicated that the "rights conferred by the
17
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Confrontation Clause are not absolute and may give way to other
important interests" (Coy, p.1022 1988). But, he asserted the
rights referred to in those cases were not the rights explicitly
set forth in the Confrontation Clause.

The rights which may

give way to other interests are the reasonably implicit rights
of the Confrontation Clause, such as the right to cross-examine
or the right to exclude out-of-court statements. Scalia
continues,
To hold that our determination of what implications are
reasonable must take into account other important
interests is not the same as holding that we can
identify exceptions, in light of other important
interests, to the irreducible literal meaning of the
Clause: 'a right to meet face to face all those who
appear and give evidence at trial' (Coy, p.1022 1988).
Justice Scalia adds, "We leave for another day, however, the
question whether any exceptions exist" (Coy, p.1022 1988). He
refutes the State's argument that an exception should be allowed
in this case to further the important public policy established
by the Iowa statute. He argues
Our cases suggest that even as to exceptions from the
normal implications of the Confronation Clause, as
opposed to its most literal application, something more
than the type of generalized finding underlying such a
statute is needed (Coy, p.1022 1988).
Therefore, Scalia concluded, because there has been no
individualized finding that the witnesses is this case needed
special protection, "the judgement here could not be sustained
by any concevable exception" (Coy, p.102 1988).

18

The Concurring Opinion

Justice O'Connor, while agreeing that Coy's confrontation
rights were violated in this particular situation, added that
Confrontation Clause rights may give way in an
appropriate case to other competing interests so
as to permit the use of certain procedural devices
designed to shield a child witness from the trauma
of courtroom testimony (Coy, p.1025 1988).
Justice O'Connor stressed in her concurrence that the majority
opinion did not "doom such efforts by state legislatures
protect child witnesses"

to

(Coy,p.1025 1988). O'Connor felt Coy's

confrontation rights were violated because requirements of the
clause may give way if the court makes a case-specific finding,
and the Iowa Supreme Court made no such finding. The Court has
consistently maintained the Confrontation Clause merely reflects
a preference for a face-to-face meeting, according to Justice
O'Connor's concurrence; thus, she stressed the clause is not
absolute. The significant societal problems that child sexual
abuse prosecution encounters are elaborated in the concurrence.
Because of these obstacles, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that
one-half of the states have statutes allowing child testimony
via one- or two-way closed circuit television (Coy, p.1024 1988).
She noted that many of these statutes raise no confrontation
rights violation claim, since testimony is taken in the presence
of the accused.

Arguing against the literal right to

19

face-to-face confrontation as absolute, O'Connor adds that it
may give way to an "important public policy" in the case where
a court makes a "case-specific finding of necessity." Regarding
a case-specific finding of necessity, O'Connor favored each
case and child witness be individually analyzed to determine
the amount of trauma which would be inflicted, the child's
ability to testify, and whether a procedural exception (such
as videotaping) would be necessary.
Justic~

O'Connor states that the protection of child

witnesses is, in her opinion,

"just such a policy." The Justice

pointed out that protecting child witnesses is a compelling
state interest, according to precedent set by Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County

- 1982) •

(457

u.s.

596, 607

Therefore, according to the concurrence, if there

is an individualized finding of potential trauma to the child
witness in a sexual abuse case the confrontation clause may
be secondary. In conclusion, Justice O'Connor offered an
important guideline - followed by many state courts since the
Coy v. Iowa decision.

She predicted that in future cases "[tlhe

primary focus . • • will likely be on the necessity prong, whether
the procedure used is necessary to further an important state
interest" (Coy, p.1025 1988).

20

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Blackmun
and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist.

The opinion expressed

strong disagreement with the majority's analysis of the
Confrontation Clause in the case of Coy (Forman 1989). Justice
Blackmun found no sixth amendment violation. The dissent
expressed that "the ability of a witness to see the defendant
while the

w~tness

is testifying does not constitute an essential

part of the protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause"
(Coy, p.1027 1988). Like Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun
followed the view that the confrontation clause merely asserts
a preference for face-to-face confrontation.

The dissent

elaborated on the important state interests underlying the Iowa
statute and the effect fear and trauma has on the testimony
of a witness, thus undermining truth-finding process of the
trial (Forman 1989). Also agreeing with the concurrence, the
dissent asserts that protecting child witnesses is an important
public policy that outweighs the right of the defendant.
However, unlike Justice O'Connor, the dissent rejected the
case-by-case inquiry requirement when deciding is such procedures
were necessary.

In conclusion, Justice Blackmun wrote that

the procedure authorized by the Iowa statute was constitutionally
upheld; thus, Coy's conviction should not have been overturned.

21
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ANALYSIS OF THE COY OPINIONS

In cases where the violation of a right guaranteed by a
constitutional amendment is in question, the Supreme Court
asserts that the state must have a compelling reason for
infringing upon that right.

This standard of strict scrutiny

was first established in Justice Stone's footnote four of United
states v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The burden

is placed upon the government to prove that there is a compelling
public interest at stake that should take precedence over the
individual constitutional right (Murphy, et. ale p.689 1986).
In Coy, the welfare of child victims and protecting them
from trauma is the public interest.

The Majority opinion finds

the defendant's constitutional right takes precedence over this
public interest.

In this case, the public interest is not

compelling enough to measure up to the test of strict scrutiny.
Justice Scalia states that the right to confrontation is
explicitly set forth in the Sixth Amendment and cannot be
outweighed by a generalized finding that child witnesses
experience trauma.

Although Scalia "leave[s] for another day

• • • the question whether exceptions exist," his absolutist
language used in the decision demonstrates his position on this
future question. Justice Scalia, who most likely included that
statement to gain the support Justice O'Connor and Justice White,

22
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believes in the literal application of the Confrontation Clause
and the need for face-to-face confrontation.
But, Justice O'Connor's concurrence asserts the importance
of protecting child witnesses. In her conclusion she states,
But if a court makes a legislative finding of necessity,
as is required by a number of state statutes, our cases
suggest that the strictures of the Confrontation Clause
many give way to the compelling state interest of
protecting child witnesses (Coy p.1018 1988).
O'Connor's concurrence, which Justice White joined, indicates
they joined

~he

majority because there was no case specific

finding of necessity in this

ca~e.

The Dissenting opinion views protection of child witnesses
as an important public policy.

Justice Blackmun's view is that

this important public policy outweighs "the narrow Confrontation
Clause right at issue here-- the 'preference' for having the
defendant within the witness' sight while the witness testifies"

(Coy, p.1031 1988).

He adds, disagreeing with the concurrence,

that it should not be necessary to show in each case that a
special procedure is needed to protect the welfare of the child,
the state should not be required to make a predicate showing
in each case.
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IMPACT OF COY V. IOWA

The impact of Coy has created confusion for the lower courts
in determining what exceptions, if indeed there are any, to
the Confrontation Clause are constitutionally acceptable (Nuce
1990).
Citing Coy, many states have upheld the constitutionality
of their child witness statutes. On the other hand, other states
have declared there child witness statutes to be
unconstitutional.

But, considering the ambiguity of Coy and

its unique facts and divergent decisions, this varied reaction
from the state courts is natural, although problematic
(Shaffer 1990).

While some commentators and courts declare

that the Coy decision from the Supreme Court calls for a per
se standard demanding face-to-face confrontation in all child
sexual abuse cases, other state courts have relied on the
concurrence of Justice O'Connor and created their own
interpretations (Nuce 1990).
The case of Robert James Tafoya demonstrates this route.
The defendant was convicted of several sexual offenses
perpetrated against six young girls (and one adult woman).
The state had a procedural exception statute which the court
allowed to be utilized at the trial. The statute provided for
the

child victims to testify via videotape.

The defendant

watched from a control booth, so the witnesses could not see
24

him, as the testimony

was taped.

This satisfied, according

to trial court, the statute's provision that the deposition
be taken" in the presence
could see the witnesses and

of • • • the defendant."

Tafoya

communicate with his attorney.

The Court of Appeals of New Mexico affirmed the conviction
of Tafoya prior to Coy, finding no violation of the Confrontation
Clause or the procedure mandated by the statute. New Mexico's
highest court denied certiorari.
Court

gran~ed

But, the United states Supreme

the writ of certiorari, and in light of Coy,

vacated and remanded the case for further consideration.

The

state court once again affirmed Tafoya's conviction on remand.
The court ruled that because there was ample evidence that
established the child witnesses would be traumatized if required
to testify in the presence of the defendant and in open court,
Tayfoya was differentiated from Coy. Therefore, while the New
Mexico court acknowledged Justice Scalia's opinion of the
majority, it placed more weight in Justice O'Connor's concurrence
(Shaffer 1990).

This was the standard followed by many state

courts after the Coy decision.

Critics of this standard claim

states are "carving out their own interpretations of Coy • •
camouflaged by case law and nibbled by necessity" with the
essential rights guaranteed to the accused being jeopardized
(Shaffer p.807 1990)

Shortly after, the Supreme Court followed

this trend of the state courts as demonstrated by the next
important case Maryland v. Craig (497 U.S. 836; S. ct. 3157).
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Maryland v. Craig - THE CASE

In October 1986, a Howard County grand jury charged Sandra
Ann Craig with child abuse, first and second degree sexual
offenses, perverted sexual practice, assault, and battery.
The victim named in each count was a six-year-old girl who had
attended, from August 1984 until June 1986, the kindergarten
and pre-kindergarten center operated by Craig. In March 1987
Craig was tried in a Maryland court on several charges for
sexually abusing the six-year-old child.

Before the trial began,

the court approved the testimony of the child witness, including
the examination and cross-examination by the prosecutor
defense counsel, taking place in another room.

In the adjacent

courtroom, the child's testimony was transmitted to
judge, and defendant.

Craig, the defendant, could

with her attorney by a private telephone line.

and

the jury,
communicate

Craig was

convicted on charges of first degree sexual assault after a
twelve day trial (G. Fields 1992).
The court rejected Craig's objection that the use of a
one-way television procedure violated the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment.

The State Court of Special Appeals

affirmed, but the State Court of Appeals reversed.

The case

was then argued before the Supreme Court on April 18, 1990 and
decided on June 27, 1990.
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THE SUPREME COURT DECISION - The Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court examined whether the use of the one-way
closed circuit television, in the case of child abuse victims,
violates the Confrontation Clause (G. Fields 1990). Justice
O'Connor delivered the majority opinion.

She was

joined by

Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and
Justice Kennedy.

The majority approved of child

testimony

via one-way closed circuit television when there were
individualized findings that child victims would suffer severe
trauma in testifying.

In asserting that the right to face-to

face confrontation is' not absolute, the majority took a "liberal
constructionist" approach in interpreting the confrontation
clause (Fields 1990).

Justice O'Connor stated that a finding

of necessity coupled with the state's interest in protecting
child witnesses from trauma was so compelling in the case of
Craig that the trial court was justified in obtaining the child
witness's testimony by
television.

the use

of the one-way closed circuit

The Court held that the procedure was not

categorically prohibited by the Confrontation Clause, and the
child was not required to be in the presence of the defendant
to determine if he or she would be traumatized (Maryland v.

Craig, p.852 1990). While O'Connor admitted that the face-to-face
confrontation is the core of the Confrontation Clause, she
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countered that

"it is

not the sine non of the confrontation

right" (Craig, p.853 1990).
The majority held that Maryland's procedure preserved
elements of confrontation.

Although the procedure prevented

the child from seeing the defendant, it "adequately ensure[d]
the testimony was both reliable and subject[ed] to adversial
test in a manner functionally equivalent to that accorded live,
in-person testimony."

Therefore, the court felt the use of

the one-way.closed circuit television did "not impinge upon
the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking or symbolic purposes"
(Craig, p.852 1990).

Justice O'Connor stressed that an adequate showing of
necessity was qemonstrated in Craig, which was the important
element missing in Coy. Referring to her concurrence in Coy,
Justice O'Connor stated,
That the face-to face confrontation requirement is not
absolute does not mean that it may easily by dispensed
with. As we suggested in Coy, our precedents confirm
that a defendant's right to confront accustory witnesses
may be satisfied absent physical, face-to-face confron
tation at trial where denial of such confrontation is
necessary to further an important public policy • • •
(Craig, p.855 1990).
Justice O'Connor added that the admission of hearsay exceptions
demonstrate the mere preference for confrontation and not an
absolute guarantee (Craig, p.856 1990).
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The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Scalia dissented and was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens.

The dissent begins "Seldom has this

Court failed so conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee
of the Constitution against the tide of prevailing current
opinion" (Craig, p.861 1990).

Justice Scalia goes on to stress

the fundamental nature of the right to confront physically the
witness durirg the trial.

Looking to Kentucky v. Stincer 482

u.S. 730; 107 S. Ct. 2658, Scalia argues that the Court has
"never doubted that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the
defendant a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses appearing
before the trier of fact" (Craig, p.861 1990). The dissent
recognizes

the majority's attempt to draw comparison to

traditional hearsay
Confrontation Clause.
in general, hinge on

precedents to create an exception to the
But, Scalia counters that exceptions,
a finding of unavailability of the witness.

Justice Scalia suggests the majority opinion is a
"subordination of explicit constitutional text to current favored
policy" (Craig, p.863 1990). Following this line of argument
Scalia adds, "Because the text of the Sixth Amendment is clear,
and because the Constitution is meant to protect against, rather
than conform to, current 'widespread belief,'
dissent" (Craig, p.864 1990).
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respectfully

•

Justice Scalia concludes,
The Court today has applied interest-balancing
analysis where the text of the Constitution simply
does not permit it.
We are not free to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis of clear and explicit constitutional
guarantees, and then to adjust their meaning to comport
with our findings. The Court has convincingly proved
that the Maryland procedure serves a valid interest, and
gives the defendant virtually everything the Confrontation
Clause guarantees (everything, that is, except
confrontation). I am persuaded, therefore, that the
Maryland procedure is virtually constitutional. Since
it is not, however, actually constitutional I would
affirm the judgment of the Maryland Court of Appeals
reversing the judgment of conviction (Craig, p.870 1990).
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ANALYSIS OF CRAIG OPINIONS

In this case the majority rules in favor of an exception
to the Confrontation Clause.

Justice O'Connor, for the Majority,

reiterates her support of the compelling interest society has
in protecting the welfare of child victims. She writes,
We likewise conclude that a State's interest in the
physical and psychological well-being of child abuse
victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh,
at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face
his or her accusers in court (Craig p.8S3 1990).
The difference between the,two cases is that a case specific
finding is called for in the Maryland statute. The majority
ruled that the state made an adequate showing of necessity in
this case, thereby justifying the use of a special procedure.
This case specific factor is what seems to have lured over
Justice White and Justice O'Connor and why this case turned
out differently than Coy.
The dissent, on the other hand, does not believe the
Confrontation Clause should be violated or that the strict
scrutiny can be lowered to an interest balancing evaluation.
Justice Scalia asserts,
I have no need to defend the value of confrontation
because the Court has no authority to question it.
It
is not within our charge to speculate that 'where face
to-face confrontation causes emotional distress in a child
witness,' confrontation might 'in fact disserve the
Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking goal' . • • For good
or bad, the Sixth Amendment requires confrontation, and
we are not at liberty to ignore it (Craig, p.870 1990).
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Justice Scalia sticks to his literal interpretation

of

the Confrontation Clause in his Craig dissent which he asserted
in his majority opinion in Coy.

While he did concede to some

exceptions from past cases to the Confrontation Clause in Coy,
Scalia excluded face-to-face confrontation as a possible
exception because it was explicit in the text of the Sixth
Amendment.
This case is the "day" when the court answered the "question
whether any'exceptions exist" to this literal right to face-to
face confrontation.

As Justice, Scalia indicated in Coy, when

it comes to the literal application of the Confrontation Clause,
the face-to-face confrontation, he answered (in his dissenting
opinion) No. Scalia stated that an exception cannot be granted.
Likewise, as she indicated in her concurring opinion in Coy,
Justice O'Connor replied Yes. O'Connor believes in a case where
an exception to face-to-face confrontation is necessary to
further an important public policy, a case specific exception
should be allowed.
Although Craig is the current precedent on this issue, it
is

tentative one.

The court is almost equally divided on this

issue and could rule differently in future cases, depending
on the circumstances and the opinions of incoming justices.
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THE AFTERMATH OF Maryland V. Craig

In this case the Supreme Court approved of a procedure
which struck a balance in favor of protecting children involved
in child sexual abuse cases.

Maryland v. Craig created an

exception to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and
established child sexual abuse victims as a class of witnesses
who may testify at a trial while avoiding face-to-face
confrontati~n

(Cusick 1991).

While children's rights advocates and prosecutors rejoice
in this decision, the ruling has met criticism.

Some critics

predict that prosecutors will attempt to invoke a similar statute
and procedure whenever the presence of the defendant renders
a child's testimony "ineffective." This would force trial courts
to interpret Craig liberally on behalf of child witnesses.
Critics fear that used in this manner, the exception set forth
in Craig "becomes a prosecutorial sword which may put many
innocent defendants behind bars" (Cussick p.967 1991). Similar
to sentiments expressed by Justice Scalia in his dissent, part
of the difficult in accepting the Craig opinion is that it is
motivated by public opinion rather than legal analysis of
constitutional right.

It appears to many critics of the

majority's decision in this case that public policy concerns
motivated the Court and an exception was created where none
could be easily found in current law (Bainor 1990).
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One author

•

compares the extreme public response to the media attention
focused on child sexual abuse to the Salem witch hunts and
McCarthy's Red Scare (Cusick 1991).
The Craig decision also generated additional problems.
The decision seems to have left legal and practical questions
unanswered (Lang 1991). Specifically, Craig does not clarify
what the level of evidence needed to invoke the exception and
the characteristics of the class entitled to its protection
(Cusick 1991).

Although this case created guidelines, issues

regarding similar statutes remain.

Additionally, uncertainty

as to whether the decision in this case will facilitate future
and further exceptions-continues (Fields 1990).

In general,

Craig provides little guidance on when and if statutory
procedures should be utilized.

This has resulted in a continuing

struggle for the state courts and legislatures (Montoya 1992).
Therefore, it is unlikely that this case represents the final
challenge to these statutes or the final decision on this legal
controversy (Lang 1991).

34

-

PRO DEFENDANT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ARGUMENT

The strongest defense against videotaped and closed circuit
testimony of children is that it is a violation of the
defendant's constitutional right. "Sacrificing the rights of
the accused for the comfort of the victim is an unprecendented
step in the wrong direction," claims Randall Shaffer in the
Kentucky Law Journal.
legitimate,

~he

He asserts that although the goal is

procedure is flawed; closed-circuit or videotaped

testimony infringes on the defendant's constitutional right
to confrontation (Shaffer 1990). Although most critics agree
that there is a need to protect children in these cases, they
argue that the right to be confronted is one of the personal
liberties guaranteed within the Bill of Rights (Fields 1992).
Additionally, prosecution is difficult in sexual abuse cases,
but "[slociety's need to prosecute accused abusers is no greater
than its need to preserve the Constitution

'~Nuce

1990).

The truth finding value of face-to-face confrontation is
another argument against

video~ape

and closed circuit statutes.

The jury is denied the chance to witness and evaluate the
demeanor of the child witness in the presence of the accused
if the testimony is shown by closed circuit television or from
a videotape (Shaffer 1990). By allowing this type of testimony,
the jury cannot accurately assess the trustworthiness of the
testimony and the credibility of the witness (Fields 1990).
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PRO CHILD VICTIM ARGUMENT

Supporters of legislation that allows taped or televised
testimony refute the argument that this type of testimony
violates the defendant's constitutional rights.

One point

asserted is that when the Confrontation Clause was ratified,
television did not exist (Montoya 1992). "When the Framers
constructed the Confrontation Clause, they had neither child
witnesses nor closed circuit television in mind"
(Fields p.167 1990).

Children were labeled incompetent and

television was not invented.
The compelling state interest of protecting children is
a second argument.

Because sexual abuse is a growing societal

problem, concessions are vital. "In the face of growing awareness
of the national problem of child sexual abuse, the modification
of defendants' confrontation rights under narrowly defined
circumstances should be held constitutional" (Nuce p.581 1990).
This argument asserts that protecting the children is a
compelling interest of such great magnitude that it overrides
the sixth amendment right to Confrontation.
of interests method and

This is a balancing

the balance is struck in favor of the

child and the society over the defendant.
Avoiding inflicting further trauma upon child witnesses
is a strong argument supporting these statutes.

The threat

of additional psychological damage to a child if the child is
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are easily influenced and led, making them less reliable
witnesses.
It is well recognized that children are more highly
suggestible than adults. Sexual activity, with the
aura of mystery that adults create about it, confuses
and fascinates them. Moreover they have, of course,
no real understanding of the serious consequences of
the charges they make • • • " (Yun p.1746 1983).
Supporters of confrontational testimony by victims of sexual
abuse also refute the inevitability of trauma being inflicted
upon the

chi~d

by the courtroom situation.

has proven inconclusive.

Empirical evidence

Psychological studies of actual victims

have shown that it is quite difficult to distinguish between
the trauma caused by the abuse itself and the trauma from the
experience in the courtroom (Forman 1989). "Some children report
feeling empowered by their participation in the process. Some
have complained, when the offender plead guilty, that they did
not have an opportunity to be heard in court" (Montoya 1992).
While this is not true in all cases, physically confronting
the accused can be therapeutic for the victim.

Although any

child who has been sexually abused will find it difficult or
traumatizing to

testify, the same can be said of adult rape

victims or murder witnesses or any of a number of witnesses
to various crimes.

This is a tragic aspect of our judicial

system, but it is nonetheless vital to the truth finding process
(Shaffer 1990).
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statutes that allow exceptions to the Confrontation Clause
for children also violate another tenant of our judicial system,
the presumption of innocence. The argument that testifying in
front of a perpetrator will be traumatic for the victim assumes
guilt inasmuch as it assumes a victim and a perpetrator (Montoya
1992). Those who support confrontational testimony by victims
of sexual abuse argue that "to abrogate a defendant's right
to confrontation compromises the foundation of the American
judicial

sys~em

[because] the presumption of innocence is a

hallmark of our judicial system"

(Nuce 1990).

An additional point which has recently been sensationalized
in the media is the possibility that children lie or fabricate
stories of abuse.

The popular belief that a child will not

be able to testify in front of the accused due to trauma or
fear assumes the child is telling the truth.

"This reasoning

is not only illogical, it is unconstitutional" (Shaffer 1990).
A Denver study in 1987 found that 8% of sexual abuse reports
were purely fictitious and an additional 22% were unsupported
by evidence.

Furthermore, a University of Michigan study found

that charges of sexual abuse were raised in approximately 30%
of Michigan's contested child custody cases (Nuce 1990).
Allegations of abuse commonly arise in divorce and/or custody
proceedings.

Studies indicate that the likelihood of false

accusations of sexual abuse increases dramatically in divorce
and custody situations (Montoya 1992). Additionally, children
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forced to testify in court in the presence of the defendant
motivates many of these statutes.

Psychologists believe that

the psychological damage is caused by both the sexual abuse
and the subsequent events, such as the reaction of the family,
repeatedly having to talk about the abuse, and testifying in
court (Bainor 1990). "Only a rare child could fail to be
traumatized by the experience of testifying in court"
(Cusick p.967 1991).

In some cases the horror of reliving

the abuse is intensified by the child's fear that the accused,
who possibly threatened the child during the sexual abuse, will
attack them in the courtroom (Nuce 1990).

Children are,

therefore, forced to cope with the trauma of the sexual abuse
and the stress of the courtroom experience.

Often,

"system-induced trauma" occurs and children may end up
contradicting themselves. Overall, the stress forced on the
victim and the family can result in additional psychological
damage during prosecution (Nuce 1990). One of the major reasons
sexual abuse cases never make it to trial is because the parents
are unwilling to further traumatize their children by forcing
them to participate in a courtroom procedure (Bainor 1990).
Supporters of shielding statutes argue that the state has an
interest in protecting young children from the trauma of repeated
appearances and extended testimony in open court in the presence
of the alleged assailant.

Therefore, a trial judge should allow

testimony to be transmitted by videotape or television if
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testifying in open court would inflict substantial trauma upon
the witness

(liThe Testimony . • 1985).

In addition to the reduction of trauma rationale, some
supporters feel these procedures actually improve the truth
finding process. Not only does videotaping protect the child
witness from continually having to repeat their testimony, it
also allows the child to withdraw early from the court
proceedings and secures the child's testimony against
forgetfulness and retraction (liThe Testimony of Child . . " 1985).
Because in many cases the prosecutions strongest evidence is
the testimony of the child, it is important the testimony be
intelligible.

But, guilt, fear, and trauma may undermine the

child witness's ability to testify effectively (Forman 1989).
Supporters, who favor closed circuit televised testimony, argue
that permitting victims to testify via closed circuit television
is the best way to " e ffectuate the state's interest in
prosecuting these cases without diminishing the defendant's
confrontation rights • . • " (Bainor p.996 1990).

While the other

side argues that confrontation elicits truth, an argument can
be made that when confrontation causes significant emotional
distress in a child, such a confrontation would actually disserve
the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking goal. "If

the child

is telling the truth, the fact-finding process will be better
served by making testifying less stressful II (Montoya p1259 1992).
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An additional argument favoring the use of videotaped
depositions for child witnesses is that videotape is uniquely
qualified to present the demeanor of the child witness as he
or she gives the statement.

The jury is better able to assess

the credibility of the witness because the child is less upset,
frightened, shy, or humiliated, and therefore, the jury is
provided with a more accurate and less emotional deposition
(Kelly 1985). Taping may also preserve the child's statements
while fresh in the child's mind and reduce the number of times
the witness has to repeat the testimony

(Fields 1990).

Similarly, closed-circuit television also allows the jury to
better assess the child's testimony.

Closed-circuit is sometime

favored because it is instantaneous and "the substantive concern
of the confrqntation clause remain fully protected"
(Bainor 1990). An important note is that cross-examination is
still utilized during this procedure.
Supporters of protective statutes also refute the claim
that children are not credible witnesses.
Distrust of children is illogical in child sexual
abuse prosecutions because false accusations are
extremely rare. Studies have reported the fabrication
rate to be between two and five percent. The majority
of false reports are adult initiated
("Rape Shield Laws . • " p. 751 1993).
For the most part, children lack the requisite knowledge
to fabricate sexual stories.

Additionally, they are not likely

to lie to their parents or authority figures about sexual abuse
(Cusick 1991).

False accusations are most prominent during

divorce proceedings and custody disputes.
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CONCLUSION

This issue of the welfare of the child victim versus the
rights of the defendant still remains unsettled. It is an ever
changing area of the law.

After some rather ambiguous Supreme

Court decisions, the burden of the issue has once again shifted
back to the state level.

At the state level, interpretation,

procedure, and the balance of interests varies from state to
state.
Alternatives do exist to these child witness statutes which
would alleviate the trauma suffered by child witnesses yet
preserve the rights of the accused. One suggestion is to place
special priority on sex abuse cases on the docket to reduce
the amount of time the child spends in the judicial system.
Another alternative is to coordinate joint investigative effort
in following up reports of sexual abuse.

This coordination

decreases the time and trauma of the child getting interviewed
repeatedly, having to relive over and over the details of the
abuse (Shaffer 1990).

Currently, in advocacy centers across

Illinois and the nation, such as McLean County's Child Protection
Network, these coordination efforts are being attempted.

The

police, the Department of Children and Family Services, and
the State's Attorney's Office all work together to eliminate
repeat interviews and speed up the investigative process.
From interning at the McLean County Child Protection
Network, I have seen firsthand the unsettling effect .
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confrontation has upon children's testimony. One little girl
on the witness stand looked over at her father, the defendant,
before answering every question.

During her testimony she became

very flustered and upset. Because Illinois does not have a
statute that allows for special procedures with child witnesses,
it was necessary for this little girl to face her father during
her testimony.
Illinois needs to place greater public policy emphasis
on the

sexua~

abuse of children and the welfare of children,

in general. The current system is adult

based and does not

take into consideration the needs of child victims and witnesses.
If the legislature refuses to design a statute which allows
for closed circuit or videotaped testimony, it should develop
an alternative which takes into consideration child witnesses.
Suggestions have included child designed courtrooms, which
are less intimidating and arranged so that the defendant is
not in the child's direct line of sight, and child advocates
which assist the children in preparing for the court experience.
Some improvements have been made in Illinois, such as the
development of Child Advocacy Centers, but additional reform
is vital.
Additional research in the area of child witnesses and
the Confrontation Clause would be very beneficial.

A state

by state comparison of the current statutes in this area is
one possibility.

This type of study could compare the
43

•

guidelines, restrictions, and procedures utilized by different.
This type of analysis may be able to determine who has the most
successful statute and/or provide a model for other states.
One aspect not yet touched upon is the importance of
prevention.

Child sexual abuse perpetuates itself, it is

important to stress that more than eighty percent of child sexual
abusers were themselves abused.

Legislatures need to concentrate

on creating legislation that will target prevention (Shaffer
1990).

At the same time, victims of sexual abuse obviously

need special treatment within our judicial system today.
victims are so vulnerable;

These

"arguably, the fabric of society

is revealed from the way these most· vulnerable victims are
treated"

(Montoya 1992).

Yet, as the debate between Sixth

Amendment confrontation rights and protecting child witnesses
continues, it remains to be seen how these victims (and these
defendants) will be treated in the future.
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